Heidegger
Against Ethics ? .
To search for ethical suggestions in Heidegger's writings may appear to be a paradox or a radical misunderstanding. ' It is well known that
Heidegger condemns any kind of ethics, from Kant's formalistic ethics, to Scheler's ethics of values, to Nietzsche's transvaluation of all values, which turns into a creation of new values. And, as is also well known, Heidegger holds that his thought, insofar as it is thinking of Being and not of beings, has to be free of any practical concern.
In the Letter on Humanism, he peremptorily asserts that the thinking of Being is "neither theoretical nor practical. It comes to pass before this distinction.
Such thinking is, insofar as it is, recollection of Being and nothing else.... It thinks Being. Such thinking has no result. It has no effect. It satisfies its essence in that it is."2 Any ethical question seems out of place not only in Heidegger's thought but also in his vocabulary, since he very seldom uses the word "ethics," and when he does, it is in order to show its inability to disclose the truth of Being.
Already in Being and Time, Heidegger places ethics among those disciplines which study Being only from an ontical standpoint. Hence ethics is assimilated to philosophical psychology, anthropology, politics, poetry, biography, and historiography.3 Each of these disciplines has investigated, "in different ways and to varying extents,"4 behavior, faculties, and possibilities of Dasein, achieving remarkable interpretations with regard to its mode of being. On an existential level, however, none of these studies shows the concern with the originary which they reach on an existentiell level. What assimilates all these disciplines is precisely the fact that they are not able to reveal the ontological dimension of the human being. Traditional ethics has been the logic of mores rather than the logos of ethos."6 Mores, and not ethos, is the theme of ethics as it has been constituted in the history of Western metaphysics.
Implicitly following Hegel's distinction, Heidegger appropriately severs the moral (das Moralische) from the ethical (das Sittenhafte) ; that is to say, he distinguishes the subjective calculus of what is good and what is bad-which in the course of tradition comes to constitute what Reiner Schurmann calls the "metaphysics of measure," aimed at offering norms, rules, and measures for right behavior7-from what accords with custom, based on an obligation which comes from freedom and on a task entrusted by the tradition. The ethical has to do with the free behavior ( Yerhaltung) , the free conduct ( Haltung) , and the historical formation of human beings; this is the ethos which, under the influence of the moral, will decay into the "ethical" (das Ethische).8 Heidegger's critique, articulated in different directions, is thus pointed at the moral, which has caused a decay in the originary ground of the ethical, in what the Greeks used to call "ethos".
The origin of such decay must be sought in Plato's philosophy, which disintegrates the originary thinking of Being into different forms of particularistic scientism, in which Being as a whole is forgotten in favor of an object proper to particular knowledge. Logic, ethics, and physics thus come to light as separate disciplines; this happens only when the
